It was a futuristic-looking aircraft, which Lockheed publicised as ‘a missile with a man in it’.
Ordinarily, a gunboat was a lesser craft, mounting just a few guns. They were particularly useful in shallow waters that larger warships could not navigate.
Remarkably, it appears that the radio was never used: the box hissed with inrushing air when it was opened by archaeologists at the Rhineland Regional Association (LVR).
The Battle of Waterloo is intrinsically linked to the Duke of Wellington and Napoleon, the towering military figures of the early 19th century.
The Chicago-born ‘slider’ became the youngest Olympic gold medallist ever as a 16-year-old at the 1928 Winter Olympics in St Moritz. Four years later, while serving as his country’s flag bearer, he piloted Team USA to another victory in Lake Placid.
The boneyard here at Davis-Monthan was established in 1946 to store WWII bombers and transports.
David Stahel’s latest book, Retreat from Moscow: a new history of Germany’s winter campaign, 1941-1942, is here to add vital nuance to discussion of the German Army in this crucial phase of the war. Over the last decade, his works on the Eastern Front have led the way in scholarly reassessment of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, demonstrating how Germany’s failure to decisively defeat the Red Army was a disaster, and left them in a highly vulnerable position for the winter of 1941-1942.
With its warm tones and bustling figures, this month’s image could – at first glance – appear almost to represent a scene of innocent activity. The truth, however, could not be more different.
This book is written rather in the style of an excellent set of lecture notes produced by a diligent tutor. Frank Ledwidge, a Fellow of Law and Strategy at the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell, leaves very few stones unturned as he leads the reader through the complete history of manned and unmanned flight, quoting liberally from a wide range of authoritative sources.
In the 1950s, the Cold War was at its height. To many, it seemed to be a question of when, rather than if, Soviet forces would exploit their overwhelming numerical superiority with a ‘steamroller’ offensive against Western Europe.